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Global biodiversity loss and degradation of natural habitats
are exceedingly linked to increasing demographic pressures,
mounting rural poverty, unsustainable extraction and use of
natural resources, and (violent) conﬂicts (Carey, Dudley, &
Stolton, 2000; Chape, Harrison, Spalding, & Lysenko, 2005;
Chape, Spalding, & Jenkins, 2008; Nolte, 2015; Stolton
et al., 2003; Worboys, Winkler, & Lockwood, 2006). The
detrimental impact of humans on conservation areas across
the world has led to implementation of exclusionary conserva-
tion policies. These policies exclude people from conservation
areas in order to achieve better environmental protection. As a
result, natural resource-related conﬂicts (NRRCs) between
local communities and protected area authorities have surged
in numbers (De Pourcq et al., 2015). NRRCs are related to a
variety of causal factors, including:
(i) forced displacement (Adams et al., 2004; Agrawal &
Redford, 2009; Brockington, Igoe, & Schmidt-Soltau,
2006; Kabra, 2009; Lele, Wilshusen, Brockington,
Seidler, & Bawa, 2010; Lustig & Kingsbury, 2006;
Peters, 1999; Schmidt-Soltau, 2009);
(ii) social exclusion (Brockington & Schmidt-soltau, 2004;
Brondo & Bown, 2011; Kelly, 2011; Lele et al., 2010;
Torri, 2011; Vedeld, Jumane, Wapalila, & Songorwa,
2012);
(iii) deﬁcient community participation processes (Brondo
& Bown, 2011; Lele et al., 2010);
(iv) denial of ancestral territorial rights (Brondo & Bown,
2011; Cisneros & Mcbreen, 2010; Peters, 1999);
(v) restrictions on community resource use priorities (Cisneros
& Mcbreen, 2010; Lele et al., 2010; Peters, 1999; Torri,1252011; Vedeld et al., 2012; West, Igoe, & Brockington,
2006).
(vi) negative impacts of conservation measures on commu-
nity resources (Brockington & Schmidt-soltau, 2004;
Brockington et al., 2006); and
(vii) impoverishment accompanying all of the above
(Adams et al., 2004; Brockington et al., 2006; Vedeld
et al., 2012; West et al., 2006).
A better understanding of the nature and dynamics of
NRRCs is essential for developing appropriate, innovative
policies that can address them in constructive ways, while at
the same time contribute to achieving both biodiversity and
livelihood goals (Campbell et al., 2001; Cisneros & Mcbreen,
2010). Local people are usually regarded as part of the prob-
lem and as not contributing to the solution. However, this
view is increasingly recognized as ineﬀective when working
toward the prevention and resolution of conﬂicts. Considering
local people simply as culprits is a presupposition that fails to
understand conﬂicts within their respective historical, political,
ecological, and economical contexts. Furthermore, it missesaccepted: December 18, 2016.
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ﬂict resolution, which build on local people’s perspectives
about the genesis and manifestation of conﬂicts (Le Billon,
2001; Peluso & Watts, 2001).
Drawing on extensive interview data with local people from
ﬁfteen national parks in Colombia, this study begins by
exhaustively characterizing park-people conﬂicts and the fac-
tors underlying their manifestations. Based on this character-
ization, together with an analysis of relevant Colombian
policy measures, we then develop a conﬂict impairment frame-
work. We use this framework to formulate a set of recommen-
dations and a step-by-step approach aimed at preventing and
mitigating the most salient identiﬁed conﬂicts.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING
CONFLICT
Leading scholars within conﬂict studies have long struggled
to ﬁnd an adequatemethod of conﬂict analysis, and there is cur-
rently no generally accepted school of thought. A conﬂict is tra-
ditionally deﬁned as ‘‘a diﬀerence in goal, perception or
interest” (Coser, 1957; Miller, Bartos, & Wehr, 2002; Pruitt,
Rubin, &Kim, 2003). According to this classic view, diﬀerences
should be addressed appropriately, as part of eﬀective conﬂict
management. This approach has been applied in many diﬀerent
contexts, including natural resource management. However, it
is increasingly criticized for its limited usefulness for mitigating
NRRCs, partly because it does not distinguish the actual con-
ﬂict from its causal factors (Bude, Converse, Edmonds, &
Fink, 2015; Yasmi, Schanz, & Salim, 2006a, 2006b).
Our research approaches the conﬂict concept through the
more speciﬁc concept of ‘‘impairment”. The impairment
model deﬁnes conﬂict as a situation in which an actor per-
ceives impairment from the behavior of another actor (Glasl,
1999). According to this approach, conﬂict consists of three
distinctive features. First, the core of the conﬂict is attributed
to two actor settings: the actions of one actor cause impair-
ment in another actor’s eyes, i.e., the ‘‘opponents” and the
‘‘proponents” (Marfo & Schanz, 2009; Yasmi et al., 2006a).
Second, the experience of an actor’s behavior or action as
impairment is the only deﬁning element for conﬂict manifesta-
tion, thereby providing a single criterion to distinguish conﬂict
from non-conﬂict situations (Glasl, 1999; Marfo & Schanz,
2009; Yasmi et al., 2006a). Third, factors or conditions that
lead to the impairments, should not be confused with the
actual conﬂicts or actual experience of impairments. They
are the sources of conﬂict or the sources of impairment. As
stated above, the separation of conﬂict sources and conﬂict
manifestations sets the classical and impairment approaches
apart. The latter approach facilitates our study of both con-
ﬂicts and their sources.
Previous research has shown that impairment plays a piv-
otal role not only in social conﬂict (Glasl, 1999), but also in
NRRCs (Marfo & Schanz, 2009; Yasmi et al., 2006a). Fur-
thermore, the impairment approach takes into account the
dynamic nature of NRRCs, whereby numbers and degree of
impairments within each actor can increase or decrease. This
is important and a more realistic approach for the NPA con-
text, as the perception of impairment can change over time in
response to the political context, demographic situation and
availability of resources (Yasmi et al., 2006a).
Other studies that used the impairment approach have ana-
lyzed conﬂict from a community perspective. These studies
assume that the state and the local community are homoge-
nous entities composed of stakeholders with the same experi-ence of conﬂict (Marfo & Schanz, 2009; Yasmi et al.,
2006b). However, neither the state nor the respective commu-
nities are homogenous entities (De Pourcq et al., 2015; De
Pourcq, Thomas, & Van Damme, 2009; Leach, Mearns, &
Scoones, 1999). There is evidence that individual community
members have diﬀerent perceptions of resource management
(problems) and experience conﬂict diﬀerently (Leach et al.,
1999; Soneryd & Uggla, 2000). A better understanding of con-
ﬂict and its mitigation requires acknowledgment of the diﬀer-
ent perceptions and experiences within a particular group or
community. To address this knowledge gap, we will analyze
perceptions of NRRCs, and its causal factors, at the level of
individual respondents.
Nolte (2015) undertook an interesting study in Colombia,
showing that current enforcement eﬀorts are insuﬃcient to
deter priority threats for conservation. Throughout the paper,
he gives a concise overview of many problems that the Colom-
bian parks face, including poor management, lack of funding,
ambiguous legal frameworks, unsafe working conditions for
park staﬀ, weaknesses in the enforcement regime and land
tenure conﬂicts. Nolte’s main conclusion is that enforcement
strategies are unlikely to yield positive results for reducing pri-
ority threats in Colombia’s natural parks unless accompanied
by resolution of land tenure, clariﬁcation of use rights,
improving patrolling strategies and protection of park guards.
Our study complements Nolte’s work by including the per-
spectives of central players, i.e., local park inhabitants, on
those matters.3. METHODS
(a) Research area and background
Colombia is a unique setting for studying NRRCs between
local communities and protected area administrations for a
number of reasons. First, this South American country is char-
acterized by an exceptionally high level of biodiversity, much
of which is located on protected land. In 2015, the country
had 58 NPAs covering 11.27% of its continental and 1.48%
of the marine territory, corresponding to a total area of
14,254,127 hectares (UAESPNN, 2015). Furthermore, a sub-
stantial number of people inhabit Colombia’s NPAs. These
comprise 93,681 people: 35,695 indigenous, 8,325 Afro-
Colombians and 47,376 subsistence farmers of mixed ethnic-
ity, often referred to as settlers or colonists (UAESPNN,
2012a, pers. comm.). Many more live along NPA borders,
but exact ﬁgures are unavailable. These people’s activities,
such as agriculture, resource extraction and construction,
infract NPA conservation goals (see also Nolte, 2015).
The inhabitation of parks and exploitation of their resources
has led to a series of resource management conﬂicts between
NPA administration and local communities. Some authors
have discussed the negative eﬀects that NPAs may have on
local livelihoods in Colombia, such as displacement, social
exclusion and impoverishment (Cuesta, 2008; Duran, 2009;
Ojeda, 2012; UAESPNN, 2012c). However, the existing docu-
mentation is very case-speciﬁc making extrapolation diﬃcult,
and analysis on the sources of conﬂicts is inadequate and
incomplete.
Here we focus on ﬁfteen Colombian NPAs (Figure 1 and
Table 1) with surface areas ranging from 1,000 to
1,000,000 hectares. These NPAs are home to various indige-
nous, Afro-Colombian and settler communities. They are sit-
uated in the country’s main bio-cultural regions of the
Amazon, Andes, and the Caribbean and Paciﬁc Coasts. Some
Figure 1. NPAs under study (NPAs that were and were not personally
visited in blue and yellow, respectively). (For interpretation of the references
to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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came into existence.
(b) Data collection and analysis
(i) Data collection
We interviewed a total of 677 respondents. At grassroots
level, we interviewed 601 persons (i.e., 473 community mem-
bers and 128 community leaders) living in or along the borders
of ﬁfteen NPAs. Most of these interviews were carried out dur-
ing ﬁeld visits (N = 586; 10 NPAs), at locations where the
respondents had their residence (e.g., in their house, or public
places). Field visits were complemented with interviews with
15 leader representatives of the ﬁve additional NPAs in nearby
towns or major Colombian cities (Figure 1 and Table 1).
The majority of the people we interviewed engaged in a
range of productive and extractive activities in NPAs for
household use or sale. The dominant livelihood activities of
participants were farming, hunting for subsistence purposes
and ﬁshing. A limited number of local men engaged in mining
activities, while some households raised cattle for milk or meat
production, both for auto-consumption and (local) commer-
cialization. Many respondents also undertook other income-
generating activities, such as daily construction work, running
restaurants or driving moto-taxis. People were often involved
in several concurrent occupations.We also interviewed 76 stakeholders at institutional level,
including staﬀ from both governmental and non-
governmental institutions. Most governmental respondents
were employed by the NPA administration, the Colombian
Institute for Rural Development (INCODER), the Geograph-
ical Institute Agustin Codazzi (IGAC, the governmental
instance responsible for issuing and updating land registers
in NPAs), and the Superintendencia de Notariado y Registro
(SI, the governmental entity responsible for registration of
land titles, among other responsibilities). Non-governmental
actors included members from law ﬁrms and nature conserva-
tion institutions, such as the World Wildlife Fund and Conser-
vation International. The majority of the interviews at
institutional level were held in Colombian cities, such as
Bogota, Cali, Santa Marta and Riohacha. As the ﬁrst author
carried out all interviews, potential interviewer bias should be
constant across all cases.
Field interviews were conducted during several trips
between 1/10/2011 and 31/08/2014. When arriving at a com-
munity, we ﬁrst requested permission during a community
assembly to undertake the research, explaining the goals and
limitations of the study. After the community granted
informed consent, we ﬁrst interviewed community leaders.
This helped us to get an overall idea of the relationship
between community members and NPA administration, and
the existence of any conﬂicts. Afterward, we conducted indi-
vidual interviews with representatives of all diﬀerent interest
groups in the community. These included men and women;
young and old; people of a wide array of occupations such
as ﬁshermen, miners and farmers; people living in the center
and edges of the villages; etc. We wrote down all conversations
during interviews and we did not make any digital recordings.
We assured respondents that all information would be treated
and analyzed anonymously.
In accordance with the impairment approach, we made a
distinction between actors experiencing impairments (local
residents) and actors whose actions are perceived as causing
those impairments (here generally NPA administrations). We
used standardized questionnaires to obtain information on
social diversity characteristics, such as sex, age, income level
and ethnic background. Semi-structured interviews were car-
ried out to improve our understanding of the categories of
conﬂicts experienced by respondents, and their opinions on
the factors underlying these conﬂicts. Furthermore, we
obtained their views on necessary steps for implementing suc-
cessful conﬂict resolution strategies.
To identify conﬂict categories, we explicitly asked commu-
nity members and leaders to free-list all actions of NPA
administrations (and staﬀ) that they perceived as an impair-
ment or conﬂict. We grouped all these reports in diﬀerent con-
ﬂict categories and presented these to NPA oﬃcials and other
stakeholders at institutional level. Administrative oﬃcials
mostly conﬁrmed that those reported impairments are repre-
sentative for the actual conﬂicts experienced by local commu-
nities residing in or near Colombian NPAs.
To identify potential causal factors of conﬂicts as well as
interventions to resolve local conﬂict situations, we speciﬁcally
asked for the opinion of oﬃcials at the institutional level as
well as community leaders. The latter respondents comprised
presidents of local community councils, teachers, and tradi-
tional leaders. We also sought the opinion of other community
members on conﬂict course and resolution strategies, but most
did not feel suﬃciently knowledgeable or directed us to ask
community leaders.
Following Mason (2002), rivalling ﬁeld hypotheses were
developed and tested in each of the case studies. We gradually
Table 1. Characteristics of the NPAs and study areas considered in this paper
NPA Region Year of
NPA creation
Surface
area (ha)
Areas of residence of community respondents (N = 601)
SFF Los Flamencos Caribbean 1977 7,615 Cari Cari and Palaima (n = 8)
Indigenous Wayuu collective territory ‘‘Perratpu”) (n = 43)
Displaced community near Tocoromana (n = 9)
Afro-Colombian communities Los Cocos and Camarones
(n = 7)
Tayrona Caribbean 1964 15,000 Indigenous community Tayrona (n = 4) Settler/ﬁsher
communities Tayrona (n = 61)
Sierra Nevada de
Santa Marta
Caribbean 1964 383,000 Settler communities La Lengue¨ta (n = 60)
Indigenous collective territory Kogui-Malayo-Arhuaco
(n = 10)
Indigenous community Kankuamo (n = 1)
SFF Los Colorados Caribbean 1977 1,000 Settler communities Los Colorados (n = 38)
Utria Paciﬁc 1987 54,300 Afro-Colombian community councils (n = 66)
Indigenous collective territory ‘‘Jurubida-Chori-Alto Baudo”
(n = 41)
Indigenous collective territory Alto Rio Valle Boro Boro
(n = 1)
Los Farallones Paciﬁc 1968 205,266 Afro-Colombian community councils Los Farallones (n = 8)
Uramba Bahia Malaga Paciﬁc 2010 47,094 Afro-Colombian community councils Bahia Malaga (n = 74)
Paramillo Andes 1977 460,000 Indigenous collective territory ‘‘Yaberarado” (n = 20)
Indigenous collective territory ‘‘Pollines” (n = 2)
Purace´ Andes 1975 83,000 Indigenous collective territory Purace´ (n = 44)
Indigenous collective territory Rio Blanco (n = 2)
Settler community Purace´ (n = 2)
Yaigoje´-Apaporis Amazon 2009 1,056,023 Indigenous collective territory ‘‘Yaigoje´-Apaporis” (n = 85)
Catatumbo-Bari Andes 1989 158,125 Indigenous collective territory (n = 4)
Los Katı´os Paciﬁc 1973 80,658 Afro-Colombian community Los Katı´os (n = 3)
Nevado del Huila Andes 1977 158,000 Settler community Nevado del huila 2
Munchique Andes 1977 47,000 Settler community Munchique (n = 5)
Amacayacu Amazon 1975 293,500 Indigenous community Amacayacu (n = 1)
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increasing numbers of people. This means that we continued
interviewing new respondents until we had suﬃcient data to
answer the research questions. According to Mason (2002),
this point is reached when informants do not add new substan-
tial information about the social process under scrutiny.
Besides participant interviews, we obtained information
from secondary sources such as previous meeting reports
and agreements between communities and NPA oﬃces, emails
and written correspondence between park administration staﬀ
and community leaders, unpublished NPA documents, and
program evaluations. We evaluated data quality using triangu-
lation where this was possible. These additional data sources
were of fundamental importance to corroborate, complement
or refute interview results (Arts & Verschuren, 1999).
(ii) Data analysis
We used a combination of qualitative and quantitative
methods for data analysis. Qualitative data analysis allows
for examination of ‘‘how things are related and interdepen-
dent” (Denscombe, 1998, p. 176) and starts from the assump-
tion that ‘‘social realities are wholes that cannot be understood
in isolation from their contexts” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.
39). We attempted to illustrate the complexity of speciﬁc situ-
ations and multiple sources of conﬂicts in the cases using data
reduction, data display and conclusion drawings (after Miles
& Huberman, 1994).
It is important to note that our analysis of conﬂict is based
on local perceptions of impairment. However, local people’s
perspectives do not necessarily match reality on the ground.For example, people may experience access conﬂicts in a con-
text where the NPA administration actually does not impose
any restriction measures. The perceptions of community mem-
bers may be fueled by rumor and gossip, and can be based on
incorrect information. This may lead to experiences that con-
tradict reality on the ground. However, since impairment
involves emotional perceptions, social interests, and their com-
bination (Glasl, 1999), rumors are equally valid conﬂict
sources as say, unfair legislation or lack of park funds. Such
perceived impairments based on rumors would equally need
interventions to be resolved. To this respect, it is interesting
to note that suspicion and distrust underlying rumors are often
the earliest sources of impairment as a conﬂict escalates (Glasl,
1999). De Pourcq et al. (2015) already showed in another
paper that distrust is among the most decisive factors for
park-people conﬂict genesis in Colombia.4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Based on interview data, we distinguished ﬁve main impair-
ment categories: (i) constrained socio-economic development;
(ii) access restriction; (iii) non-compliance; (iv) constrained
communication and participation; and (v) imposition of
exogenous objectives (see Figure 2 for conﬂict categories,
Table 2 for full meaning, see also De Pourcq et al., 2015).
Local leaders and administrative oﬃcials reported ﬁve prin-
cipal factors underlying the conﬂict manifestations: (i) the
legacy of Colombian environmental policy, based on the so-
called fortress conservation model (see also Brockington,
Figure 2. Impairment framework (based on Yasmi et al., 2006a, 2006b) with proportions of individuals (N = 677) reporting the main impairment categories
and their principal sources. Black lines denote the most significant relations between source and impairment.
Table 2. Impairments experienced by respondents. The percentages refer to the proportion of individuals (where N = 601) experiencing certain conflict
categories
Category Meaning Examples of actions perceived as impairment %
Limited development Actions intended to prevent or limit local
infrastructure and/or development projects
Limitations to the building of houses, schools,
tourism infrastructure, road construction, gas
pipelines, electricity networks, etc
50
Access restriction Actions intended to prevent people from having
access to a particular resource
Restriction on extraction and/or use of natural
resources (e.g., timber extraction); restriction on
access to land and/or entrance to territory;
obstruction of the legalization or formalization of
land ownership
48
Non-compliance Non-compliance by NPA administration with
previous agreements or existing rules
Non-compliance with prior informed consent
procedures (e.g., appointment of park
functionaries without consulting local
communities); non-compliance with (co-
management) agreements and promises to
adequately reﬂect community interests in NPA
management; etc
47
Constrained participation Actions that intentionally or unintentionally limit
participation of stakeholders in NPA decision-
making
Constrained local leadership in NPA management
and administration; no, or limited numbers of,
local park employees; constrained coordination
and communication between NPA staﬀ and local
communities; barriers to community access to
information; etc
44
Imposition of objectives Actions implemented to pursue management
objectives or goals of the NPA administration
beyond the will or interests of the local
community
Enforcement of the imposition of NPAs on
ancestral lands; obligation of local residents to
undertake certain management operations; forced
displacement; etc
39
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ﬂicts of interests within the Colombian government; (iv) vio-
lent environments; and (v) weak organization at community
level (Figure 2 for categories, and Table 3 for full deﬁnitions).
Administration weaknesses and the fortress conservation
model were most frequently cited factors by both parties.
Respondents at the institutional level were more likely to claim
the presence of violent environments, weak community orga-
nization and conﬂicts of interests in comparison to local lead-
ers.
In what follows, we focus on the role of the fortress conser-
vation model and administration weaknesses in conﬂict gene-
sis. Violent conﬂicts have been an unfortunate reality inColombia for over 40 years. We decided to integrate this fac-
tor in our discussion for its undeniable inﬂuence on park-
people relationships.
This discussion is structured, following the ‘‘Conﬂict
Impairment Framework” shown in Figure 2, in which we
relate the ﬁve dominant sources of conﬂict to ﬁve prevalent
impairment conditions.
(a) The fortress conservation model
The NPA model introduced in Colombia, and other parts of
the global South since the 1950s, is based on the US example
of Yellowstone national park. This model considers nature
Table 3. Conflict sources experienced by local leaders and respondents at the institutional level (N = 204). The percentages refer to the proportion of
individuals reporting each of the conflict sources
Category Meaning Examples of conﬂict sources Relationships with conﬂict
conditions or impairments
%
Fortress conservation model Inconsistency between the
classical approach for nature
protection, which separates
national parks from people,
and socio-economic realities
on the ground
Non-compatibility between
NPAs and tenure regimes;
non-compatibility between
NPAs and local resource use
and extraction customs;
absence of a legal framework
supporting participation
and/or local leadership in
NPA management
Environmental regulations
feed conﬂicts related to
limited development, access
restriction, constrained
participation, and imposition
of objective
84
Administration weaknesses The problem of so-called
paper-parks (see e.g., Carey
et al., 2000; Lockwood et al.,
2006), where areas are de-
clared as protected by a
government but never fully
implemented
Lack of ﬁnancial (and
human) resources;
nonexistent, contradictory
and/or unclear
environmental regulations;
lack of reliable information
on NPA contexts, etc
Weaknesses have brought
about a tradition of non-
compliance with
conservation related eﬀorts
78
Violent environments Ongoing violence and
political instability within or
near NPAs
Armed conﬂict;
displacement; the production
and merchandising of illicit
crops; etc.
Ongoing violence makes it
diﬃcult to comply with
conservation processes
32
Conﬂict of interests Conservation and local
livelihoods are secondary to
the exploitation of nature for
ﬁnancial and political gain
Public money injected in the
NPAs that are more
marketable and valuable as
tourist destinations; the
granting of mining permits
and initiation of other
development projects within
certain NPAs, etc
Hidden interests of the
government (i.e., tourism
and mining) may lead to
non-compliance with
conservation obligations
34
Weak local organization Weaknesses, instability and
low capacity at the local
community level
Fragile local organizations;
internal community conﬂicts;
power struggles for local
leadership; local corruption;
undemocratic
decisionmaking processes at
the local level; etc
Community weaknesses put
at risk the eﬀective and
eﬃcient implementation (i.e.,
compliance) of conservation
projects
23
130 WORLD DEVELOPMENTreserves free of humans as the ultimate conservation ideal
(Adams et al., 2004; Kalamandeen & Gillson, 2006; Lele
et al., 2010; Lockwood, Worboys, & Kothari, 2006;
UAESPNN, 2007, 2012a, 2012a, 2012c, pers. comm.; West
et al., 2006). This so-called fortress conservation model (term
used ﬁrst by Brockington, 2002), has been identiﬁed by
researchers around the world as the basic reason for the esca-
lation of a range of park-people conﬂicts (Adams et al., 2004;
De Pourcq et al., 2015; Kalamandeen & Gillson, 2006; Lele
et al., 2010). Implementation of this model in Colombia
implicitly assumed that most NPAs were not already inhab-
ited. However, in reality nearly all NPAs had been inhabited
and/or used by a wide range of local communities long before
their creation. Three distinctive dimensions of Colombia’s
environmental legislation implementing the fortress conserva-
tion model are particularly problematic.
First, according to Colombian environmental legislation
(Ministerio de Ambiente Vivienda y Desarollo Territorial,
Decree 622 of 1977, Art. 7), NPAs are incompatible with all
types of land tenure except in the speciﬁc case of legally estab-
lished indigenous territories. As a consequence, people not for-
mally recognized as indigenous are not allowed to formalize
individual or communal land ownership rights in NPAs.
If an individual or a group of people obtained legal property
rights before the creation of a particular NPA, the ColombianState (through INCODER) is legally entitled to reclaim these
rights through ﬁnancial compensation (either by negotiation
or direct appropriation; Ocampo Duque & Chilamack,
2012). Once the property rights are obtained, the original
landowners may be evicted or relocated to other areas
(Ocampo Duque & Chilamack, 2012). If the individual or
group lacks legal property rights but has inhabited the speciﬁc
NPA since before its creation, the Colombian government
(through INCODER) is empowered to conﬁscate their lands.
Existing inhabitants are ﬁnancially compensated for any land
improvements (e.g., investments in agriculture, infrastructure,
etc.) that they carried out, after which they could be relocated
outside the NPA (Ocampo Duque & Chilamack, 2012;
UAESPNN, pers. comm.). Property purchase and land
improvements that occurred after NPA creation are not recog-
nized as legally established property (El Congreso de
Colombia, Law 2 of 1959, Art. 13; El Congreso de
Colombia, Law 99 of 1993). Hence, under such conditions per-
sons or communities can be removed from NPAs without any
compensation.
There are multiple cases of forceful evictions of people from
NPAs in Colombia. To our knowledge, the most recent exam-
ple occurred in Tayrona NPA, which is located along the Car-
ibbean Coast and is one of the most famous touristic areas in
the country. In March 2010, a ﬁshing community in Gairaca
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homes destroyed (Republica de Colombia Consejo de
Estado, 2011 community members and UAESPNN, pers.
comm.). Although these ﬁsher families had inhabited and used
the area since before its transformation into a NPA, they
received no compensation, based on the contention that their
activities were in contradiction with the NPA’s conservation
objectives.
Despite the public status of NPAs, under which it is illegal
to sell or buy land within their limits, Colombian notary agen-
cies and the relevant State authority (i.e., INCODER) have
frequently adjudicated land ownership acts inside NPAs after
their creation (Table 4; Superintendencia de Notariado y
Registro, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f).
For example, during 2002–03 the number of private properties
within the boundaries of Tayrona NPA increased from 108 to
160 (Ojeda, 2012). Inconsistencies in public policy related to
the adjudication of land ownership deeds within NPAs have
fostered park-people conﬂicts all over the country. These con-
ﬂicts are caused by the government’s inability or unwillingness
to validate or value ownership deeds that were legalized by the
State in earlier times. For example, in the lowlands of the
Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta NPA several landowners and
high-level government oﬃcials obtained land ownership cer-
tiﬁcates. Anecdotal reports from IGAC staﬀ indicate that
these certiﬁcates may lose legitimacy within the next decade
(IGAC staﬀ, pers. comm.) as private land ownership within
NPAs is illegal. Local elites have indicated they strongly
oppose the notion of land expropriations and that, if neces-
sary, they would use violence to safeguard their territories
(community members, pers. comm.).
A second problematic dimension of Colombia’s environ-
mental legislation is the non-compatibility between NPAs
and resource use and extraction activities. Conservation law
prohibits all activities that the NPA administration deems to
cause signiﬁcant modiﬁcations to the natural environment or
as a threat to the NPA’ natural capital. This includes activities
such as wood extraction, ﬁshing, agriculture, cattle ranching,
industrial development projects, oil production and mining
(Ministerio de Ambiente Vivienda y Desarollo Territorial,
Decree 622 of 1977, Art. 30). Access restrictions resulting from
this legal framework are a signiﬁcant source of conﬂict in all
visited NPAs. Furthermore, the legislation precipitates con-
ﬂicts related to restrictions to local development such as build-
ing projects in Colorados, the denial of tourist infrastructure
development projects in Tayrona, and the obstruction of local
gas and electricity lines in the lowlands of the Sierra Nevada
de Santa Marta.
By law, both indigenous territories that co-exist with NPAs,
and Afro-Colombian communities predating the establish-
ment of the NPAs in which they are located, have the right
to continue traditional production practices and income-Table 4. Number of properties adjudicated after NPA creation (Superintendenci
NPA Total ha (approx.) Num
and pe
La Lengue¨ta* 15,356
Tayrona 15,000
Nevado Del Huila 158,000
Los Hermosas 125,000
Pisba 45,000
Los Nevados 38,000
Farallones 206,770
*A deﬁned subregion of the NPA Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.generating use of renewable natural resources. However,
NPA administration often restricts these rights, argumenting
that certain activities are incompatible with the conservation
objectives as established by the NPA administration of a par-
ticular area (El Congreso de Colombia, Law 70 of 1993, Art.
22; Ministerio de Ambiente Vivienda y Desarollo Territorial,
Decree 622 of 1977, Art. 7). An example of constraints on tra-
ditional practices is where Afro-Colombian families are forbid-
den to undertake their customary ﬁshing activities in some of the
NPAs of the Paciﬁc region, such as in Utria and Sanquianga.
Restrictions on indigenous and Afro-Colombian traditional
productive practices are a clear human rights violation, accord-
ing to the International Labour Organisation convention of
1989. This was ratiﬁed by Colombia in Law 21 of 1991.
Respondents reported a third major problem within envi-
ronmental legislation and subsequent legal frameworks. This
was the regulation of community participation and local lead-
ership rights in NPA creation and management. These legal
regulations were a major source of constrained participation
conﬂicts.
In response to international commitments, the Colombian
NPA administration adopted the Policy of Social Participa-
tion in Conservation (PSPC) in 2002. The PSPC prescribes
the need for dialog with, and the participation of, indigenous,
afro-descendant and subsistence farmer communities in NPA
administration. It also declares that NPA management has
the objective of addressing historical conﬂict situations in
NPAs and foster sustainable development solutions (Unidad
Administrativa Especial del Sistema de Parques Nacionales
Naturales, 2007). However, Colombian environmental regula-
tions (El Congreso de Colombia, Law 2 of 1959; El presidente
de la Rebublica de Colombia, Decree 2811 of 1974; Ministerio
de Ambiente Vivienda y Desarollo Territorial, Decree 622 of
1977) have not been aligned with the PSPC, and this discrep-
ancy creates legal loopholes. In reality, these legal regulations
hold more weight in comparison to the PSPC when it comes to
legal decision-making. Thus, the legal statuses maintain strong
limitations on community participation in NPA management
practices.
(b) Weaknesses in management capacity
Colombia experiences similar diﬃculties as other developing
nations in the realization of its national conservation commit-
ments. It shows a lack of institutional capacity and resources,
unclear and contradictory legislation, weak national planning
strategies and nonexistent co-ordination between governmen-
tal agencies (see also Carey et al., 2000; Garcı´a-Frapolli,
Ramos-Ferna´ndez, Galicia, & Serrano, 2009; Lockwood
et al., 2006; Nolte, 2015; Stolton et al., 2003).
Respondents at community and institutional levels fre-
quently reported weaknesses in management capacity as aa de Notariado y Registro, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f)
ber of ha studied
rcentage of total area
Number of properties acquired
after NPA creation (surface in ha)
8,424 (55%) 103 (5,076)
15,117 (100%) 172 (9,636)
3,459 (2%) 102 (1,844)
19,393 (16%) 233 (12,778)
3,848 (8%) 111 (1,105)
16,083 (42%) 68 (3,429)
5,754 (3%) 718 (3,943)
132 WORLD DEVELOPMENTsource of the experienced conﬂicts (67% and 94%, respec-
tively). It is remarkable that nearly all NPA staﬀ interviewed
identiﬁed the administrative weaknesses of their own institu-
tion as the most important factor contributing toward park-
people conﬂicts. This is in line with Nolte’s research (2015),
which pointed out that many Colombian park oﬃcials are
frustrated about the weaknesses in management and prevail-
ing enforcement regimes. Below, we examine the weaknesses
listed most frequently by both parties in our study.
A ﬁrst weakness is the lack of ﬁnancial resources, which is a
problem of many, if not most, NPAs around the world. Very
few protected areas turn proﬁts, with the vast majority
depending on external funding (Cundill, Thondhlana,
Sisitka, Shackleton, & Blore, 2013). In Colombia, the budget
assigned to each NPA is about USD 100,000 per year on aver-
age or less than USD 0.5 per hectare (UAESPNN, 2012a).
This is very low, even considering that every dollar assigned
by the Colombian Government is matched by external funding
(UAESPNN, pers. comm.). According to NPA staﬀ, the bud-
get assigned is insuﬃcient to undertake even the most basic
management activities such as ecological restoration, support-
ing community-based organizations, and enacting conﬂict res-
olution initiatives (see also UAESPNN, 2011, UAESPNN,
pers. comm.).
Secondly, as in numerous other countries of the Global
South (see e.g., Garcı´a-Frapolli et al., 2009), the Colombian
federal government lacks a systematic overarching national
planning strategy for nature conservation. Furthermore, sev-
eral regulations are contradictory, and there is confusion
about the legal mandates and competencies of relevant conser-
vation agencies (see also Nolte, 2015).
Respondents also frequently listed the lack of a national
conservation strategy. This is most apparent in the absence
of a coherent regulative framework that regulates the use,
occupation and tenure regimes of settlers in NPAs. Several
NPA employees conﬁrmed that there are no concrete strate-
gies or proposals, let alone solutions, for resolving problems
resulting from the presence of thousands of settlers in Colom-
bian NPAs. These problems include illegal land occupation,
environmental degradation, and/or rural poverty. Settlers
are legally not allowed to exploit land within NPAs and do
not have access to public services, such as gas and sanitary
infrastructure, and/or cheap governmental loans. However,
the Colombian government has not undertaken any serious
initiative to arrange their relocation. In the SFF Los Colora-
dos and Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta NPAs, settlers showed
willingness to leave the area if they were relocated to other
areas and/or paid for their lost territories. They blamed local
NPA administration for not undertaking the necessary legal
steps to make this happen.
Another constraint in enacting conservation programs in
Colombia relates to weak or non-existent coordination both
within and among governmental agencies at diﬀerent levels
(i.e., federal, regional and local governments). This problem
has been reported in a number of other countries of the Global
South, such as Mexico (see e.g., Garcı´a-Frapolli et al., 2009).
Consequently, many challenges requiring eﬀective inter-
agency cooperation are mismanaged or ignored. These include
compliance with complex regulatory frameworks and issues
related to resource use, land occupation, and tenure regimes
of settlers (see also Nolte, 2015).
A further point is that conservation policies have been
implemented without clear integration and understanding of
local contexts. Most NPA administrations lack accurate infor-
mation on the number of inhabitants, their origins and their
current activities, the exact NPA boundaries, the numberand extension of private properties, the actual threats of
armed groups, and/or precise biodiversity data. Many respon-
dents argued that this absence of updated information cer-
tainly leads to misunderstandings between diﬀerent parties,
inappropriate budgetary, logistical and priority planning,
and general mismanagement. Eventually, the lack of informa-
tion can lead to conﬂict.
Weaknesses within the NPA administration management
capacity have brought about a tradition of non-compliance
(an important impairment condition). Stakeholders do not
comply with a range of issues, including implementing co-
management arrangements and conservation laws, and sup-
porting local development projects (see also Figure 2).
(c) Violent environments and unstable political context
The potential detrimental impacts of armed conﬂict on (for-
est) conservation in protected areas is well known (Dudley,
Ginsberg, Plumptre, Hart, & Campos, 2002; Ordway, 2015).
Yet, few examples exist of the implications of armed conﬂict
on park-people relationships.
Violent environments in Colombia continue to place rela-
tionships between park managers and local people under
strain. Such environments include armed conﬂicts and their
associated processes of displacement, as well as the production
and merchandizing of illicit crops (mainly coca and mari-
juana). According to Nolte (2015) park staﬀ oﬃcials in
Colombia often experience risk to their well-being resulting
from enforcement practices in the recent past. Several park
employees were killed in the previous decades and the presence
of armed groups within parks is quite common. Furthermore,
park employees said they would avoid high-conﬂict tasks, such
as the identiﬁcation and sanctioning of violaters, to reduce the
risk of retaliatory actions (Nolte, 2015).
We also experienced that violence complicates governmental
agency access to NPAs, and thus hampers communication
between park authorities and local communities. For example,
in the Munchique NPA, park oﬃcers could not enter areas of
the park in 2012 due to the presence of guerrilla and paramili-
tary groups. This was also the case in many other NPAs, such
as Macarena, Paramillo, Catatumbo-Bari, and Farallones.
Under such conditions, a healthy dialog and negotiation
between NPA administrations and local communities can be
complex. On several occasions, NPA staﬀ referred to the ‘‘vio-
lent environment” as a reason for being unable to comply with
co-management agreements, environmental regulations and
land purchasing processes. In 2012, IGAC employees needed
to obtain permission from armed groups to enter the Sierra
Nevada de Santa Marta NPA to revise property titles and make
inventories. Several of the IGAC staﬀ members interviewed sta-
ted that when they were refused entrance, they were forced to
base their judicial assessments of tenure and occupation regimes
for this NPA mainly on second-hand information (i.e., inter-
views). This resulted in erroneous interpretations, which were
then used to implement conservation programs, and to possibly
initiate eviction measures in this UNESCO Biosphere Reserve.
NPA oﬃcers complained that landowners are often associated
with armed groups and are reluctant to return their lands to
the government. They stated that landowners undertake every-
thing in their power to prevent governmental agencies from
entering their areas. Several residents from the Sierra Nevada
de Santa Marta NPA explicitly declared that community mem-
bers were considering the use of violence against park oﬃcers to
safeguard their territories.
There was a large divergence in the perception of commu-
nity level and institutional-level respondents about violent
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by 8% and 70%, respectively; see also Figure 2). Many NPAs
in Colombia are governed from a distance through uniform,
centralized, and technocratic management, which often leads
to a lack of understanding and knowledge of the situation
on the ground, including security conditions (see also
Garcı´a-Frapolli et al., 2009 for the case of Mexico). Colom-
bia’s history of violence, political instability, and State oppres-
sion makes it diﬃcult, and often dangerous, for government
employees to enter contested areas (here NPAs). For local
people, instability and oppression is part of their daily lives
and they may not necessarily regard it as a factor that compli-
cates park-people relationships, or simply prefer not to men-
tion it, to avoid the risk of worsening relations with local
armed groups.5. THE WAY FORWARD: SOME SUGGESTIONS
This paper is premised on the idea that when particular con-
ﬂict sources are present, associated conﬂicts (now also known
as impairments) are also present. The conﬂict impairment
framework was employed to describe the exact associations
between conﬂict sources and resultant impairments. The
model suggests unidirectional links between particular sources
and impairments (see Figure 2). The conﬂict examples fea-
tured throughout the paper provide strong qualitative evi-
dence for these links. As such, the impairment framework
was revealing as for the ﬁrst time it proved to be helpful to
understand actual park-people conﬂict situations, and thus
be valuable for the resolution of these conﬂicts. We recom-
mend further research that uses the impairment approach
for studying and resolving conﬂicts in other common pool
resource contexts, such as ﬁsheries, agriculture, forestry, and
water management.
Our ﬁndings suggest that interventions at multiple levels are
needed to work toward the eﬀective resolution of the identiﬁed
park-people conﬂicts. We propose ﬁve priority areas of action
for the Colombian government.
First of all, the environmental legislative body needs to be
reformed. It is paramount to improve local participation
rights in NPA management and eﬀectively move from auto-
cratic approaches of governance to the concept of co-
governance. The establishment and management of NPAs as
a mechanism to divide and control people, spaces and
resources may strengthen legitimacy and state governance
(Peluso & Vandergeest, 2011; Roth, 2008). However, it often
also leads to the exacerbation of a range of park-people con-
ﬂicts. Previous research has shown that co-management of
NPAs, whereby the management of its resources is shared
by public and/or private sector stakeholders, can be successful
in reducing conﬂict at grassroots level. This is true as long as
some critical enabling conditions, such as information-
sharing, eﬀective participation and beneﬁt-sharing, are real-
ized in practice (De Pourcq et al., 2015).
Inclusionary conservation might not be the silver bullet
solution for all the problems faced by NPAs. However, it is
all too easy to criticize and deny the need for involving local
groups in protected area management, when no concrete alter-
natives are readily available. Today, inhabitation of Colom-
bian NPAs and/or use of its resources are strongly limited
or completely forbidden, yet fair relocation, subsistence and
income-generating alternatives are usually not provided.
Numerous members of the Colombian conservation society
that were interviewed, including park directors, believed the
relocation of farmer inhabitants is inevitable to allow for eﬀec-tive biodiversity conservation in NPAs. However, this goal is
unrealistic, at least in the short to mid-term future. It is highly
doubtful that Colombia will have the necessary funds to relo-
cate all farmers (>47,000 people, and growing) to other areas.
Current budgets assigned to NPAs are insuﬃcient to under-
take even the most basic management activities such as ecolog-
ical restoration and developing alternative livelihood
strategies.
A second priority area of action for the Colombian govern-
ment is to empower the NPA administration. Moving beyond
the so-called paper-parks, i.e., areas that are declared as gov-
ernment protected yet never fully implemented, requires that
environmental regulations be followed on the ground. To
accomplish this, the NPA administration needs more ﬁnancial
and human resources, training opportunities, and increased
accessibility to information necessary for adequate NPA man-
agement. Furthermore, functional mechanisms need to be put
in place to facilitate eﬀective coordination within and among
governmental agencies at diﬀerent levels. The NPA adminis-
tration also needs more legal decision-making power to con-
front the complex challenges found within NPAs.
Thirdly, peaceful and safe living conditions in NPAs are
essential for avoiding and mitigating park-people conﬂicts.
Colombia has recently entered a peace-building process at
numerous levels. This progression hopefully represents a
major step in ensuring that the competition between resource
extraction and conservation stays within constructive borders
and does not escalate.
The Colombian government also needs to re-align its con-
servation goals with other interests (e.g., the exploitation of
nature for ﬁnancial and political beneﬁt), and to ensure that
regulations, interventions and investments are not in contra-
diction with one another.
Finally, more eﬀorts are needed to overcome weaknesses in
local organizations’ institutions and capacities. Without
strengthening the capacities of these organizations, the imple-
mentation of both local development goals and environmental
regulations on the ground, will not succeed. It should be clear
that the responsibility for park-people conﬂicts not only lies
with park oﬃcials. Multiple intra- and inter-community prob-
lems, such as power struggles for local leadership or illegal log-
ging and mining in NPAs, may remain and put undue pressure
on park-people relationships.
We expect the ﬁndings of this study to be valuable for
managing conﬂict in protected areas in other tropical coun-
tries. Literature examples on park-people conﬂicts in the
South, including those on displacement (e.g., Brockington
et al., 2006), social exclusion (e.g., Lele et al., 2010) and
impoverishment (e.g., Adams et al., 2004), are comparable
to the Colombian experiences. Similarly, protected area desig-
nation and management elsewhere in the tropics is aﬀected by
comparable complex realities and historical trajectories, as the
ones detailed in this paper, including fortress conservation (see
e.g., Adams et al., 2004; De Pourcq et al., 2015; Lele et al.,
2010) and the paper-parks phenomenon (Carey et al., 2000;
Lockwood et al., 2006; Stolton et al., 2003).
Looking ahead, a major challenge for protected areas in
Colombia and elsewhere will be to overcome the dichotomy
between biocentric and anthropocentric approaches to biodi-
versity conservation. Finding a balanced approach to conser-
vation that is actionable in practice calls for a clear deﬁnition
of acceptable trade-oﬀs between human development and nat-
ure protection goals in NPAs. There is some evidence that the
conservation state of protected areas tends to be higher when
they are inhabited and/or managed by traditional societies
(Ellis & Porter-Bolland, 2008; Vergara-Asenjo & Potvin,
134 WORLD DEVELOPMENT2014). However, this does not automatically imply that all
activities carried out by residents in NPAs should be tolerated.
It is clear that some activities such as illegal gold mining activ-
ities simply need to be banned from NPAs, full stop. Further
research is needed to determine which interventions lead most
eﬃciently to conﬂict resolution and mitigation but also conser-vation gains. For example, is it possible that conservation
goals are achieved regardless of the fact that NPA residents
are exposed to multiple conﬂict situations? Or can conserva-
tion fail even at low levels of conﬂict? In any case, a better
understanding of the potential linkages between conﬂict and
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